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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission rejecting the
Referee's proposed findings and holding that the Claimant's industrial injury combined
with a pre-existing permanent physical impairment to render him totally and permanently
disabled, thereby subjecting the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) to liability. The
ISIF agrees that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled after reaching
maximum medical improvement in August of 201 0, from an industrial accident that
occurred in January of 2005, and which was aggravated in August of 2008.
The Claimant's brief on appeal describes the accident succinctly and then
suggests that this is just a dispute over who should pay the Claimant's total permanent
disability benefits. From Claimant's perspective that is not an unfair statement since his
arguments focus not on whether Claimant is so disabled, but on a reimbursement issue
between Claimant and the Employer/Surety. For the ISIF, it is "why" Claimant is totally
and permanently disabled that causes this case to present much more than a fight over
"who pays."
This case presents the Court with the opportunity to reaffirm for the
Industrial Commission what is meant by "substantial and competent evidence," as was
addressed not long ago in Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d
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718 (20l3). In this case, the only professional medical opinion in the record providing a
basis or reason for the final restrictions and limitations resulting in Claimant's total and
permanent disability was given by Dr. David Simon. It is the Industrial Commission's
second-guessing of his medical testimony and creating its own medical opinion from the
lack of medical evidence that is the problem in this case. The Commission created its
own medical facts and opinion, rather than recognizing and applying the competent
medical evidence before it, as Referee Taylor had done in his proposed decision.
Additionally, this case presents the opportunity for the Court to reaffirm
that the "but-for" test set forth in Garcia is still the test to be used by the Industrial
Commission in determining the "combined with" factor of ISIF liability, and that if
ignored, the Industrial Commission has committed legal error.

B.

Course of Proceedings Below, Disposition and Judicial Facts

Claimant filed a Complaint on July 8, 2009, in respect to an injury date of
January 3,2005. The Employer/Surety filed an Answer to Complaint on July 17,2009,
admitting there had been an accident on January 3, 2005. Claimant later filed a
Complaint against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) on January 26, 2011,
alleging a low back injury as a preexisting physical impairment of consequence. The
ISIF filed an Answer that denied liability. R., pp. 1-13.
A hearing was held before Industrial Commission Referee Alan Reed
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Taylor on the following issues: "(1) Whether, and to what extent, Claimant is entitled to
disability in excess of impairment; (2) Whether apportionment for a pre-existing or
subsequent condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406 is appropriate; (3) Whether
Claimant is entitled to permanent total disability pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine or
otherwise; (4) Whether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is liable pursuant to Idaho
Code § 72-332; (5) Apportionment under the Carey Formula; and (6) Pursuant to Idaho
Code § 72-406(2), upon a subsequent injury to the same body part for which income
benefits were previously paid and now culminating in total permanent disability, is there
a deduction for the previously paid income benefits received for the previous injury to the
same body part and, if so, does that deduction inure to the Employer/Surety or to the
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF)?" R., pp. 14-15. The parties agreed that those
were the issues that needed to be determined.
After hearing the evidence presented at the hearing and reviewing the posthearing briefs and deposition transcripts, Referee Taylor issued his proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation on June 8, 2012, finding no liability on
the part of ISIF. Referee Taylor noted that the opinions of disability were based on
restrictions found by the FCE, and that it was Dr. Simon's opinion that the restrictions in
the FCE were due to the 2005 accident. Referee Alan Taylor's Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation (June 8, 2012), p. 13, «)[ 32. Further, Referee
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Taylor found that "Dr. Simon reaffirmed in his post-hearing deposition that Claimant's
symptoms and increasing back problems in 2008 were related to his 2005 industrial
accident. There is no conflicting medical opinion." Id. Referee Taylor concluded that
"[t]he evidence establishes that Claimant's permanent physical restrictions rendering him
unemployable all arise from the 2005 accident. Claimant and Employer/Surety have
failed to establish that Claimant's preexisting impairment combined with his 2005
industrial injury so as to invoke ISIF liability." Id., pp. 13-14, <J[ 33.
Referee Taylor stated his conclusions as follows:
1. Claimant has proven he suffers permanent disability of
100%, inclusive of his 15% permanent impairment. He has
proven he is totally and permanently disabled.
2. Apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406( 1)
moot.

IS

3. ISIF bears no liability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332.
4. Apportionment under the formula set forth in Carey v.
Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686
P .2d 54 (1984), is moot.
5. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406(2), Employer/Surety are
entitled to a deduction of $27,348.75 for permanent disability
benefits previously paid for the same body part.
Id.,p.17.

In contrast, the Industrial Commission filed its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order on July 26, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as the decision
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and/or order). That Order rejected Referee Taylor's proposed findings, and instead stated
as follows:
1. Claimant has proven that he is totally and permanently
disabled;
2. ISIF liability is established;
3. Claimant has permanent physical impairment totaling
15%, with 5% referable to the 1994 accident and 10%
referable to the 2005 accident;
4. Per Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107
Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984), Employer's liability is
calculated as follows: 10115 x 85 = 56.7 + 10 = 66.7%, or
$99,599.78;
5. ISIF is liable for the payment of statutory benefits
commencing 333.5 weeks subsequent to Claimant's August 4,
2010 date of medical stability;
6. Employer/Surety is not entitled to offset its obligation to
pay the award by the provisions of Idaho Code 72-406(2).
7. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated.
R., p.41-42.
This appeal was timely filed seeking this Court's review of the errors in the
Industrial Commission's final action in adopting its own medical opinion and findings,
outside the evidence.
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c.

Statement of Facts

The ISIF agrees with the basic facts related in Claimant's brief on appeal
concerning the Claimant's upbringing, education and work history. Likewise, competent
medical evidence shows Claimant had a previous injury at the interspace between the L3
and L4 vertebrae of the lumbar spine which resulted in a 5% permanent impairment.
On January 3, 2005, Claimant was in the course of his employment
performing his usual mandatory under-the-hood pre-trip inspection of his delivery semitruck which required him to climb about 36" off the ground. When stepping down off the
truck, his foot slipped on a steel panel under the snow resulting in a very awkward fall
causing an injury at the L4-5 interspace of his lumbar spine. He received treatment from
Dr. Clark Allen who eventually performed surgery at the single L4-5 interspace. Ex. D,
p. 16. In August 2008, Claimant suffered an aggravation of that injury as a result of
driving a stick-shift pickup truck to Jackson, Wyoming and back to Pocatello in the
course of his employment. Ex. D, p. 33. In response to a letter from the Surety inquiring
about the cause for treatment, i.e. whether it was related to his original injury of January
3,2005, Dr. Allen's partner, Dr. Honeycutt opined that it was related to the 2005 injury
with no evidence of a new injury, i.e. a progression of the original injury of January 3,
2005 and a continued decline and failure of his injured disc. Ex. D, p. 43. Dr. Allen
ultimately performed a lumbar fusion from L2 to L5 to treat the 2005 injury. Ex. D, p.
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60. Maximum medical improvement was reached on August 4,2010 subsequent to the
fusion surgery, with a diagnosis of failed back syndrome.
The deposition testimony of David C. Simon, M. D., was taken December
7,2011, at Idaho Falls, Idaho. David C. Simon is a physician licensed in the state of
Idaho specializing in physical medicine and rehabilitation, and board-certified in that
field. He has practiced in the Idaho Falls area since July 1995. Dr. Simon Depo., p. 5, L.
2 - p. 6, L. 8. He interviewed the Claimant at the request of the Idaho State Insurance
Fund and authored reports dated 12110/2008,31112009 and 8/412010. He also had certain
medical records pertaining to Claimant for review prior to issuing those reports. Dr.
Simon Depo., p. 6, LL. 9-25.
The doctor explained his opinion that the appropriate impairment rating
following the 2005 accident would have been a total of 13% whole person, 5% preexisting and 8% new, and after the 2008 aggravation, an additional 2% assigned by Dr.
Simon himself, or 15% total. Dr. Simon Depo., p. 11, L. 24 - p. 14, L. 11; p. 22, L. 24p. 27, L. 10.
Dr. Simon also stated that Dr. Allen's lumbar decompression and fusion
surgery on April 6, 2009 was, in his opinion, for treatment of the problems from the
work-related 2005 injury at the L4-5 level of the lumbar spine, with the fusion spanning
from L2 to L5. The prior problems in 1994 were at L3-4 and did not require treatment at
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that point in time. Dr. Simon Depo., p. 14, L. 12 - p. 15, L. 5; p. 27, L. 16 - p. 29, L. 12.
In Dr. Simon's opinion, Claimant's date of maximum medical
improvement was August 4,2010, when he examined the Claimant, rather than earlier,
even though the fusion was fixed and stable earlier. Dr. Simon Depo., p. 31, L. 9 - p. 33,
L. 21. In the records Dr. Simon had to consider was a Functional Capacity Examination

report from Corey Rasmussen, PT, DPT from August 2009. Dr. Simon also expressed
his opinion that the restrictions found in FCE "are permanent and they would be related
to the industrial injury." Ex. K, p. 14. There is no contradictory or conflicting medical
opinion in the record.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

The Industrial Commission's finding of combination, subjecting

ISIF to liability, is not supported by substantial and competent evidence in the
record.
B.

The Industrial Commission failed to apply the correct legal test

regarding the potential combined causal effect of the industrial injury of 2005 and
preexisting permanent physical impairment for purposes of ISIF liability.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
Factual determinations made by the Industrial Commission will not be

overturned on appeal if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Code §
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72-732; Wernecke v. St. Maries loint School Dist. No. 401,147 Idaho 277, 281, 207 P.3d

1008, 10 12 (2009). "However, if the findings of the Commission are not supported by
substantial, competent evidence, they are not binding or conclusive ... [and such]
findings of fact will be set aside on appeal." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154
Idaho 750,302 P.3d 718,726 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
"Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion." Henry v. Dept. of Correction and State Insurance Fund,
154 Idaho 143,295 P.3d 528,530 (2013). "Whether the Commission's factual findings
are supported by substantial and competent evidence is a question of law." Tarbet v. l.R.
Simplot Company, 151 Idaho 755,758,264 P.3d 394,397 (2011). The Court exercises

free review over questions of law. Henry v. Dept. of Correction and State Insurance
Fund, 154 Idaho 143,295 P.3d 528,530 (2013). "Whether the Commission correctly

applied the law to the facts is an issue of law over which [the Court] exercises free
review." Id. While Idaho's worker's compensation statutes are construed liberally in
favor of the worker, "conflicting facts need not be construed liberally in favor of the
worker." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d 718,723 (2013).

IV.

THE LAW DEFINING THE SCOPE OF ISIF LIABILITY
The ISIF is often referred to as the Second Injury Fund because of the law

governing the circumstances under which a claimant is entitled to benefits from the Fund.
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The scope of ISIF liability is governed by Idaho Code § 72-332, which states, in relevant
part:
72-332. Payment for second injuries from industrial special
indemnity account. (1) If an employee who has a permanent
physical impairment from any cause or origin, incurs a
subsequent disability by an injury or occupational disease
arising out of and in the course of his employment, and by
reason of the combined effects of both the pre-existing
impairment and the subsequent injury or occupational disease
or by reason of the aggravation and acceleration of the
pre-exlstmg impairment suffers total and permanent
disability, the employer and surety shall be liable for payment
of compensation benefits only for the disability caused by the
injury or occupational disease, including scheduled and
unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured employee
shall be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits
out of the industrial special indemnity account. ...
Idaho Code § 72-332.
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that under this provision, in
order for IS IF liability to be established, a claimant must prove four elements of a prima
facie case, as follows: "(1) that there was a pre-existing impairment; (2) that the
impairment was manifest; (3) that the impairment was a subjective hindrance; and (4)
that the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury in some way combine[d] to
result in total permanent disability." Bybee v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund,
129 Idaho 76,80,921 P.2d 1200, 1204 (1996) (citing Dumaw v. 1.L. Norton Logging,
118 Idaho 150, 155,795 P.2d 312,317 (1990)).
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V.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Industrial Commission's finding of combination, subjecting

ISIF to liability, is not supported by substantial and competent evidence in the
record.
The Industrial Commission's decision to impose liability on ISIF must be
supported by substantial and competent evidence as to all elements of the prima facie
case. Idaho Code § 72-732; see also Dumaw v. J.L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150,795
P.2d 312 (1990). The burden is on the party seeking to impose liability on ISIF to prove
all elements of the prima facie case. Garcia v. J.R. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 970, 772
P.2d 173, 177 (1989). Substantial and competent evidence is "more than a scintilla of
proof, but less than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion." Funes v. Aardema Dairy, 150 Idaho 7,10-11,244 P.3d
151,154-55 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Though the
Commission is the final arbiter of the evidence, it cannot arbitrarily create medical
evidence nor weigh medical evidence that is not part of the evidentiary the record.
Finally, a finding that a particular fact cannot be found to the requisite certainty is the
equivalent of a holding that the burden of proof has not been met. Manning v. Potlatch
Forests, Inc., 93 Idaho 856, 857, fn. 2,477 P.2d 97,98 (1970).

A recent Idaho Supreme Court case, Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc.,
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154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d 718 (2013), is highly instructive with respect to what will be
considered substantial and competent medical evidence in a worker's compensation case.
In that case, the Court found that the Commission's referee had disregarded qualified
medical opinions and had substituted her own medical opinion. Mazzone, 302 P.3d at
727. In so holding, the Court stated that the referee and Commission "must accept as true
the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless the testimony is
inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing
or trial." Mazzone, 302 P.3d at 726, quoting Pierstorffv. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho
438,447,72 P.2d 171 (1937). The Commission's role "is that of a finder of fact and not
a medical expert," and the Commission may not exceed that role and "engage[] in
medical diagnosis." Mazzone, 302 P.3d at 728.
Further, the Court stated that although members of an administrative board
or agency may have acquired some expertise in a particular area of administrative law,
"[t]here is ... a line between use of that expertise and the adjudicative function of
resolving factual disputes in administrative proceedings." [d. The Court noted that the
United States Supreme Court has held that administrative officers may not act on their
own information, and "that an agency that uses its specialized knowledge as a substitute
for evidence will not have its order sustained." Mazzone, 302 P.3d at 728-29, quoting
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258, 263 (1924). The Court
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concluded that "an agency may not use its specialized knowledge as a substitute for
evidence presented at a hearing. An agency may, however, utilize its expertise in
drawing inferences from the facts or record or to resolve conflicts in the evidence."
Mazzone, 302 P.3d at 729 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The legal error in the Commission's fact-finding methodology is evident
when paragraphs 19-22,26,27,36, and 4S-47 are considered under the legal criteria set
forth in Mazzone.
In paragraph 19, the Commission found that "[t]he record does not reflect
that Dr. Huneycutt took any history from Claimant concerning the low back difficulties
from which he had suffered prior to the date of the January 3, 200S accident ...
Therefore, in the absence of a history of an intervening event, Dr. Huneycutt was of the
view that Claimant's continuing problems at L4-S represented a natural progression from
the original injury. Notably, Dr. Huneycutt did not comment on the genesis or cause of
Claimant's degenerative disc disease at levels other than L4-S." R., p. 26-27, q[ 19.
Similarly, in paragraph 21, the Commission stated: "As did Huneycutt, Dr. Simon
concluded that in the absence of a history of intervening injury or MRI changes
consistent with an acute disc herniation, Claimant's L4-S problems were likely a
progression of the problems first noted following the 200S work injury." R., p. 28, q[ 21.
The Commission takes Dr. Huneycutt's and Dr. Simon's failure to mention
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the prior low back injuries as a failure to consider those injuries. The Commission takes
the absence of a fact in the record or notes by Dr. Huneycutt or Dr. Simon reflecting a
review of the prior low back problems and turns it into a positive fact that the doctors did
not know about or consider the prior low back injuries. The absence of notes or
testimony could just as easily mean that the doctors did not think they were important and
did not contribute to the Claimant's current problems. There is no substantial and
competent evidence in the record as to why the doctors did not mention the prior low
back problems, and the Commission cannot create this as evidence in the record and rely
upon it to make its own findings. Even if it is true that the doctors did not review the
prior low back problems, it does not follow that a review of those problems would have
changed their opinions. In Mazzone, the referee excluded a certain doctor's opinion
because she believed that the doctor's "opinions would change if she had considered
additional evidence." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d 718,
727 (2013). The Court stated: "A referee may not undiagnose a claimant before the
Commission based on the referee's own lay understanding of what the referee believes
would change a qualified medical professional's diagnosis and professional opinion." Id.
Next, the Commission concluded, in paragraph 45, that "[i]t is equally clear
that Claimant's L2-5 fusion was undertaken because of the L4-5 lesion thought to be
related to the January 3, 2005 accident and the multilevel degenerative changes in
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Claimant's lumbar spine first noted in 1994, and progressing thereafter." R., p. 20, <J[ 45.
There is no competent medical evidence in the record establishing that surgery was
necessitated by the 2005 accident and the prior low back problems. The Commission
appears to have concluded that because the surgery covered both the L4-5 problem and
the higher levels, the surgery was, at least in part, necessitated by the prior problems.
Going even further, the Commission appears to conclude, in the absence of any
competent medical evidence, that the surgery would not have been necessary due to the
2005 accident alone. These possible steps of logic cannot substitute for medical opinion
on these issues.
Similarly, the Commission found that "it is notable that the only injury
identified with the January 3, 2005 accident is the L4-5 disc herniation. However, the
February 15, 2005 MRI demonstrates severe degenerative changes at levels above and
below the L4-5 level. The findings at these levels demonstrate significant progression of
the degenerative process in the years since the prior 1994 study, a progression that has
not been related by any medical expert to the January 3, 2005 accident." R., pp. 36-37, <J[
45. No one is denying that Claimant had pre-existing problems at other levels of the
spine that were not related to the 2005 accident. According to the Commission's
analysis, the fact that those problems existed, and no doctor says they are related to the
2005 accident, means the inquiry is over.
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In paragraph 46 of its decision, the Industrial Commission further
substituted its own experience for medical opinion in the record when it stated "[I]n the
absence of multilevel problems, surgeons typically prefer to limit fusion procedures to
levels where it is absolutely necessary in order to preserve lumbar spine motion." R., p.
37, <j[ 46.
Finally, and most importantly, the Commission completely disregarded the
only competent medical opinion in the record as to the cause of Claimant's current
restrictions and thus his total and permanent disability. In paragraph 26, the Commission
stated: "Although Dr. Simon stated that a causal relationship existed between Claimant's
complaints and the 2005 work injury, he did not state that the 2005 work injury was the
exclusive cause of Claimant's failed back syndrome. Indeed, in his subsequent
deposition, Dr. Simon proposed that the need for the L2-5 fusion surgery was, in part,
causally related to Claimant's multilevel degenerative disc disease." R., p. 29, <j[ 26.
Although Dr. Simon did not use the word "exclusive," it does not mean the Commission
can substitute its own medical opinion based on the doctor's clear speculation that the
need for the surgery may have been related to the degenerative disc disease. Far from
"proposing" that the need for surgery was related to the prior back problems, what Dr.
Simon actually said was: "I'm not a surgeon. I'm not sure why he went up to the L2, but
that being closer to the L3-4 level. I mean, that level would also be - you know, that
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would more likely be related to the pre-existing problems and the problems at the L3-4
level than the work-related L4-5 level." Dr. Simon Depo., p. 14, L. 25 - p. 15, L. 5.
Further, the Commission found:
We recognize that Dr. Simon has stated that the
limitations/restrictions defined in the FCE are related to the
January 3, 2005 accident. At first blush, this appears to
support a conclusion that it is the 2005 accident, standing
alone, and without contribution from the preexisting
impairment, that renders Claimant totally and permanently
disabled. If true, then there can be no 'combining with' and
the claim against the ISIF would fail on this element of the
prima facie case. However, Dr. Simon was not examined
about this statement at the time of his deposition, and it is not
entirely clear that his intentions in making this statement are
as described by the ISIF.
R., p. 36, I}[ 44 (emphasis added). Dr. Simon stated a clear medical opinion regarding the
cause of the restrictions resulting in Claimant's total permanent disability. The Industrial
Commission disregarded that clear opinion because the doctor was not asked about it at
his deposition, and they do not know what his "intentions" were. This is the creation of
evidence from the lack of evidence discussed in Mazzone as a denial of due process. The
Commission shifted the burden to IS IF to prove the case against itself where the evidence
was not in the record.
There was one competent medical opinion that Claimant's total and
permanent disability was the result of the 2005 industrial accident. There is absolutely no
contradicting medical opinion. In the absence of a contradicting opinion, the
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Commission disregarded the one qualified medical opinion and substituted its own
unqualified, and wholly unsupported, opinion.
The Referee's proposed findings and conclusions followed the law and the
proper legal analysis of the evidence of record. As noted previously, that proposed
decision noted the Claimant's total permanent disability in the opinions of both
vocational experts, received into evidence, but each of which relied on the restrictions
contained in the Functional Capacity Examination of August 2009, which according to
the only medical opinion in the evidence, were causally related to the injury of January
2005. As was noted in that recommended decision, "[tJhere is no conflicting medical
opinion." Referee Alan Taylor's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation (June 8, 2012), p. 13, ~132 (emphasis added).

The Commission, on the other hand, came up with an analysis based on the
lack of evidence of information considered by various physicians to create positive
evidence, and on its own experience of why surgeons fuse more than one level of a spine,
to decide that there was a conflict in the medical evidence justifying their rejection of Dr.
Simon's clearly stated opinion. Such is reversible error, not harmless error as it was
deemed in Mazzone, as this action of the Commission hits right to the heart of the issue of
ISIF liability. The Court should not condone such legal error.
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B.

The Industrial Commission failed to apply the correct legal test

regarding combination for purposes of ISIF liability.
The fourth element in a prima facie case to establish ISIF liability is
combination - the preexisting physical impairment and the industrial injury must
combine in some way to cause the claimant's total and permanent disability. In Garcia v.

l.R. Simplot Co., the Court set forth the test that is to be utilized by the Industrial
Commission in determining whether the combination element of a prima facie case
against IS IF has been met. 115 Idaho 966, 772 P.2d 173 (1989). In that case, ISIF
argued, and the Idaho Supreme Court agreed, "that is it not sufficient under I.e. § 72332(1) to show simply that a claimant is totally and permanently disabled and suffered
from some pre-existing condition that can be defined as a permanent physical
impairment." Garcia, 115 Idaho at 970, 772 P.2d at 177. Instead, the Court held "that
the burden of proof is on the party seeking to invoke the liability of ISIF under the statute
to show that the disability would not have been total 'but for' the pre-existing condition."
Id. The Commission cannot arbitrarily shift the legal burden of proof to the party

defending the claim.
Burden of proof means both the "duty of establishing the truth of a given
proposition or issue by such quantum of evidence as the law demands and an "obligation
resting upon a party to meet with evidence of a prima facie case." Hannan v.
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Northwestern Mutual L~fe Insurance Co., 91 Idaho 719,721,429 P.2d 849,851 (1967),
citing 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence, Sec. 123, p. 154. In Worker's Compensation cases, the

Claimant must show a "claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical
probability." Cole v. Stokely Van Camp, 118 Idaho 173, 175, 795 P.2d 872,874 (1990).
The "but for" test set forth in Garcia has been consistently reiterated and
applied by the Court since that time. See, e.g., Selzler v. State of Idaho, Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund, 124 Idaho 144, 146, 857 P.2d 623,626 (1993) ("ISIF is not

liable unless the disability would not have been total but for a preexisting condition.");
Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 192,207 P.3d 162, 168 (2009) (Industrial

Commission used correct standard when it "looked at 'whether [claimant's] pre-existing
physical impairments combined with the last accident to render him totally and
permanently disabled, or stated another way, whether [claimant] would have been totally
and permanently disabled but for his last accident."'); Wernecke v. St. Maries loint
School Dist. No. 401,147 Idaho 277, 284, 207 P.3d 1008,1015 (2009) ("ISIF is liable to

provide compensation to a worker only when the claimant shows that he or she is totally
and permanently disabled because of the combination of a permanent pre-existing
physical impairment and a new industrial injury.") (emphasis in original).
In the instant case, the Commission failed to apply the but-for test set forth
in Garcia in its analysis of the combination factor of ISIF liability. The Commission
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concluded that because Claimant was rendered totally and permanently disabled after his
back surgery, and because the Commission decided that the back surgery addressed both
new and old physical problems, ISIF liability was established. That analysis and
conclusion utterly fails to apply the but-for test. The inquiry the Commission should
have made is: Would Claimant have been totally and permanently disabled but for the
preexisting impairment; and, would he have been totally and permanently disabled but
for the last accident, or in other words, would the restrictions from the 2005 accident
have rendered the Claimant totally and permanently disabled without regard to the prior
physical impairment? The Commission must find from the evidence, not its own medical
opinion, that but for the pre-existing impairments, Claimant would not have been totally
and permanently disabled. That analysis cannot be satisfied merely by finding that
Claimant had pre-existing permanent physical impairments.
By its analysis, the Industrial Commission impermissibly shifted the burden
to the ISIF to produce evidence that it is not liable, rather than examining the record to
see whether there is a prima facie case against it. By taking medical opinion, for which
there was no conflicting medical opinion, and creating a conflict, not from evidence but
from its medical analysis, the Commission impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to
the ISIF, a legal error.
The case of Tarbet v. l.R. Simplot Co. is instructive here. 151 Idaho 755,
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264 P.3d 396 (2011). In that case, the Industrial Commission held "that the employee's
final injury caused him to be permanently and totally disabled, without considering his
prior injuries, so that the employer, rather than the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund,
[was] liable for the employee's total disability payments." Tarbet, 151 Idaho at 757,264
P.3d at 396. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the employer argued that "the
uncontested evidence showed 'that [employee] had significant problems with his hearing
loss and low back injury and these impairments impacted [employee's] ability to perform
his job.'" Tarbet, 151 Idaho at 759,264 P.3d at 398. The employer "then recount[ed]
testimony showing the impact of these impairments upon how [employee] performed his
job, the actions he took such as changing how he performed certain work and requesting
assistance from others, and the accommodations made by Employer." Id. As to that
argument, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: "Employer's argument in this regard misses
the point. Employer cannot sustain its burden of proof merely by showing that Claimant
had pre-existing impairments. Employer has not contended that Claimant was totally
disabled prior to his last industrial accident. It must show that but for the pre-existing
impairments, Claimant would not have been totally and permanently disabled. Employer
cannot sustain that burden merely by showing that Claimant had pre-existing permanent
impairments." Id.
Like the employer's argument in Tarbet, the Industrial Commission's
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analysis in this case "misses the point." The Commission rests its finding of ISIF liability
solely on the fact that when doing surgery to address the problems at the L4-5 level of
Claimant's lumbar spine, Dr. Allen also extended the fusion to the L2-3 and L3-4levels.
The problems at the L4-5 level were due to the 2005 industrial accident, while the
problems at L2-3 and L3-4 were due to pre-existing degenerative disc disease.
Therefore, the Industrial Commission concludes without medical opinion that Claimant's
surgery, and the extent of it, was necessitated by both the subject accident and Claimant's
preexisting condition. This is the equivalent of the employer's argument in Tarbet, and
completely disregards the requirement of combination.
No one is disputing that Claimant had pre-existing degenerative disc
disease at those levels of his lumbar spine. However, the mere fact that he had such a
pre-existing condition, or even that the surgeon spanned those levels while trying to
stabilize the L4-5 disc space, does not mean that the pre-existing condition "combined
with" the new injury to render Claimant totally and permanently disabled. The medical
evidence in the record is to the effect that the 2005 injury, as aggravated in 2008, was the
reason surgery was performed. There is no competent medical opinion in the record
indicating anything otherwise. There is likewise no conflicting medical opinion that the
restrictions following surgery were causally related to the 2005 injury, with no opinion
attributing them to preexisting physical impairment.
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In other words, there is no competent medical evidence in the record that
"but for" the pre-existing impairment, the 2009 surgery, as performed, would not have
been necessary. However, the Industrial Commission did not even mention or attempt to
apply the "but for" test necessary for finding ISIF liability. Instead, the Commission
simply determined that since there was a pre-existing impairment, and since the surgeon
spanned higher levels of the spine in attempting to fix the 200512008 L4-5 injury from
the industrial accident, "it is clear that the combining with element of the prima facie case
has been met." R., p. 37, I}[ 47.

VI.

RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S APPEAL
It is evident, but nevertheless should be expressed, that the IS IF has no

interest in the issue raised by the Claimant!Appellant. Therefore, the ISIF will not
present written or oral argument on that issue.

VII.

CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission both created its own medical opinion to serve

the decision it wished to issue imposing liability on the ISIF, rather than relying on the
evidence of record, and also ignored the "but for" test on whether the last industrial injury
combined with any preexisting permanent physical impairment in causing the Claimant's
total and permanent disability. This case is not one where the Industrial Commission
issued an opinion requesting more evidence to clarify issues it felt were not resolved by
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the evidence of record. Rather, the Commission acted upon the

of rp."nrri

improperly to reach a result and ordered that the decision was final and conclusive as to
all matters adjudicated pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-718. The Commission's
decision acknowledges that the ISIF would not be liable absent ignoring Dr. Simon's
clear medical opinion that the 2005 injury was the cause of the restrictions resulting
Claimant's total permanent disability. Accordingly, the Court should reverse
Industrial Commission's decision and order the case against the

upon

evidence in the record.
this _ _

October, 2013.

Paul R Rippel, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent!
Cross-Appellant

29

OF
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
on this date served upon the persons named below by mail, hand delivery or facsimile
transmission.
this

of October, 2013

J. Lewis, Esq.

1391
Pocatello,
83204-1391

Mail
[ ]
[ ]

J

M. Jay

Box 4747
Pocatello,
83205

[ ]
( ]

30

